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IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION
OF ATTA: LIMITING THE SCOPE OF
THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION*
I. INTRODUCTION
With Israel being their primary target,' Palestinian terrorist
groups' are responsible for some of the most violent attacks
worldwide.3 These groups place a high premium on accomplish-
ing their political goals and to achieve that end they use indis-
criminate forms of violence, very often against civilians.' These
seemingly random victims include Israeli athletes, school chil-
dren, and civilians on passenger buses.5 Perhaps what is most
disturbing is that these terrorists refer to themselves as
"fedayeen," or self-sacrificers willing to die for their causes.
8
Therefore, they are unresponsive to the counterterrorist policies
of target states.
7
The United States Department of State views terrorist
groups as a major threat to world peace.8 Israel, however, has
been somewhat successful in lessening the threat of terrorist ac-
tivities by using sophisticated airport security systems and by
developing an efficient organization that deals with bombs found
* This Comment disagrees with the views set forth in Note, In Re Extradition of
Atta: Tension Between the Political Offense Exception and U.S. Counterterrorism
Policy, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 163 (1989). That Note takes the view that the political
offense exception is necessary to preserve due process rights and primarily discusses
Magistrate Caden's In Re Extradition of Atta, No. 87-M-0551 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988)
(1988 Westlaw 66866) opinion which was reversed by the district court opinion discussed
in this Comment. In re Extradition of Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
1. Bremer, Countering Terrorism in the 1980's and 1990's, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 61,
62 (1989) [hereinafter Bremer, Countering Terrorism]. Israel, while being their main tar-
get, is not their only target. Id.
2. Palestinian terrorist groups include the Abu Nidal Organization, Al-Fatah, 15
May Organization, Force 17, Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction, Palestine Libera-
tion Front, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Special Command, and Popular Struggle Front.
United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1987, Pub. No. 9661
(Aug. 1988) [hereinafter Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism].
3. Bremer, Countering Terrorism, supra note 1 at 61.
4. Beres, The Ever Violent Middle East, in THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM 79
(W. Lineberry ed. 1977) [hereinafter Beres].
5. Beres, supra note 4, at 79.
6. Beres, supra note 4, at 79.
7. Beres, supra note 4, at 79.
8. Bremer, Countering Terrorism, supra note 1, at 61.
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in populated areas.9 Additionally, the United States has contrib-
uted to the counterterrorist effort through a three-part policy °
which includes: (1) refusing to negotiate with terrorist groups;"
(2) pressuring states not to use terrorism as part of their foreign
policy; 12 and (3) imposing sanctions on terrorists for their crimi-
nal actions.'3 This policy appears to be an effective method for
reducing terrorism. 4 Nevertheless, terrorism is a persistent in-
ternational problem'5 which must be addressed by all members
of the international community so that it will be substantially
reduced.' 6
Extradition is one process that should help to alleviate the
effects felt by terrorist groups. Extradition is helpful because the
terrorists that are extradited, if found guilty in the state in
which the terrorist act was committed, will be punished for their
9. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, supra note 2, at 8.
10. The United States Ambassador at Large for Counterterrorism, L. Paul Bremer,
III stated three pillars of American counterterrorist policy in a statement before the
House Foreign Affairs Committee:
First, we will not accede to terrorist demands. We will not pay ransom,
pardon convicted terrorists, or pressure other countries to give in to terrorist
demands. In other words, we will make no deals. But we will talk to anyone
authoritative-anywhere, anytime-about the welfare and unconditional release
of our hostages.
Second, we have taken the lead in pressuring states which support terror-
ist groups and use terrorism as part of their foreign policy. We have shown
these states that they will be penalized for supporting terrorism. The United
States will not tolerate their aiding and abetting terrorist groups by supplying
them with weapons, money, passports, training bases and safehouses.
Third, we are imposing the rule of law on terrorists for their criminal ac-
tions. Good police work is catching terrorists, and they are being brought to
trial. Since 1986, the United States has had a law which enables our law en-
forcement agencies to better combat terrorism overseas. Popularly called a
"long arm" statute, the law makes it a Federal crime to kill, injure, threaten,
detain, or seize an American citizen anywhere in the world in order to compel a
third person or government to accede to a terrorist's demands.
Bremer, Terrorism: Its Evolving Nature, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 74-75 (1989) [hereinafter
Bremer, Terrorism].
11. Bremer, Countering Terrorism, supra note 1, at 1.
12. Bremer, Countering Terrorism, supra note 1, at 1.
13. Bremer, Countering Terrorism, supra note 1, at 1.
14. Bremer, Countering Terrorism, supra note 1, at 61; Bremer, Terrorism, supra
note 10, at 74-76.
15. In 1988 a record 900 international terrorist incidents occurred. Bremer, Terror-
ism, supra note 10, at 74.
16. Bremer, Countering Terrorism, supra note 1, at 61. Recently, Saudi Arabia be-
headed 16 Pro-Iranian Kuwaitis for their participation in terrorist activities. Ibrahim,
The Saudis Behead 16 Pro-Iran Kuwaitis Linked to Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,
1989, at Al, col. 1. It is this Comment's view that the action taken by Saudi Arabia is
perhaps the most extreme method of combating terrorism.
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heinous acts. Serious legal issues arise when considering terror-
ism in light of existing extradition law. A critical question that
must be addressed in extradition cases is whether the offense
committed by the person for whom extradition is sought is crim-
inal or political in nature.1" This is an important issue because
extradition treaties generally provide that persons who commit
acts that are labeled as "political offenses" are not extradita-
ble."8 Since terrorists by definition undertake certain actions in
order to further a political goal, problems arise since terrorist
acts may fall within the scope of the political offense exception.19
Thus, the political offense exception to extradition is a major
obstacle to the efforts to combat terrorism.
Recent United States case law dealing with the extradition
of terrorists reveals the difficulties the courts have had in deter-
mining whether or not terrorist activities fall within the political
offense exception to extradition.20 The recent case of In the
Matter of the Extradition of Atta2 ' discussed the precise scope
of the political offense exception and its applicability to a Pales-
17. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
18. The United States "has included the political offense exception in each of its 96
treaties of extradition." Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial
Participation in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 250
(1982) [hereinafter Lubet, Extradition Reform].
The United States has entered into bilateral extradition treaties with the following
countries: Albania; Argentina; Australia; Austria; Bahamas; Barbados; Belgium; Bolivia;
Brazil; Burma; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Congo (Brazzaville); Costa Rica; Cuba; Cyprus;
Czechoslovakia; Denmark; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Estonia;
Fiji; Finland; France; Gambia; Federal Republic of Germany; Ghana; Grenada; Greece;
Guatemala; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; It-
aly; Jamaica; Japan; Kenya; Latvia; Lesotho; Liberia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxem-
bourg; Malawi; Malaysia; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Monaco; Nauru; Netherlands; New
Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay;
Peru; Poland; Portugal; Romania; San Marino; Sierra Leone; Singapore; South Africa;
Spain; Sri Lanka; Surinam; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Tanzania; Thailand; Tonga;
Trinidad and Tobago; Turkey; United Arab Republic; United Kingdom; Uruguay; Vene-
zuela; Yugoslavia; and Zambia. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1990). See also infra notes 39-41 and
accompanying text.
19. A widely accepted definition of "terrorism" is "premeditated, politically moti-
vated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clan-
destine state agents, usually intended to influence audience." Department of State, Pat-
terns of Global Terrorism, supra note 2, at v. A wider definition of a terrorist is "anyone
who attempt[s] to further his views by a system of coercive intimidation." J. MURRAY, A
NEW ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES (1919) cited in W. LAQUEUR, TER-
RORISM 6 n.3 (1977). Recently, "the term 'terrorism'. . . has been used in so many differ-
ent senses as to become almost meaningless, covering almost any, and not necessarily
political, act of violence." Id. at 6.
20. See infra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
21. 706 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
tinian terrorist who bombed a bus that was en route to Tel
Aviv.22 The court, after reviewing previous case law and analyz-
ing the situation surrounding the acts of the Palestinian terror-
ist, determined that not all politically motivated acts should fall
within the political offense exception. 3 The court concluded
that the actions of the terrorist in question were not protected
by the political offense exception of the United States-Israel Ex-
tradition Treaty24 and thus granted extradition to Israel.25
This Comment will explore the history of the political of-
fense exception and explain why a clear definition of "political
offense" is needed.26 It will examine whether the political offense
exception covers acts of terrorism and will argue that the excep-
tion should not apply to terrorists. The need for reform of the
political offense exception is apparent because United States
cases that invoke the exception generally cannot be reconciled
with the cases that render it inapplicable. This Comment will
argue that the necessary reform cannot come from the courts
and accordingly recommends that the legislature take action to
ensure that counterterrorist efforts will not be hindered by the
inconsistently applied political offense exception.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History
Extradition is a process whereby one country makes a for-
22. Id. at 1034-52.
23. Id. at 1042-50.
24. Convention on Extradition Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the State of Israel, Dec. 10, 1962, 14 U.S.T. 1707,
T.I.A.S. No. 5476 [hereinafter United States-Israel Extradition Treaty]. Article VI, sec. 4
states: "Extradition shall not be granted in any of the following circumstances: 4 When
the offense is regarded by the requested Party as one of a political character or if the
person sought proves that the request for his extradition has, in fact, been made with a
view to trying or punishing him for an offense of a political character." (emphasis
added). Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1042-50, 1052.
25. Id.
26. There is no universally accepted definition of "political offense," however, there
is a distinction made between "pure political offenses" and "relative political offenses."
See Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13
INT'L L. & POLrrlcs 621, 623-24 (1981); Lubet, Extradition Reform, supra note 18, at
253. Pure political offenses are limited to acts directed against the state and are never
extraditable while relative political offenses are generally common crimes connected to a
political element. With a relative political offense, the requested state must determine if
there is a sufficient nexus between the crime and the political goal in order to invoke the
exception. Id. See infra notes 177-94 and accompanying text.
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mal request that another country surrender an accused criminal
or convicted fugitive to the requesting state's jurisdiction. The
right to demand extradition of a fugitive, as well as the duty to
surrender the fugitive to the requesting state, arises from bilat-
eral and multilateral extradition treaties.28 These treaties either
include specific lists of offenses for which extradition may be
granted, or state that the acts for which extradition is requested
must be regarded as a criminal offense under the municipal law
of each party to the treaty.29
Today, extradition is used primarily to effectuate the sur-
render of a person accused or convicted of a crime.30 Ironically,
this was neither the intent nor the purpose of the original prac-
tice of extradition. From ancient times until the end of the sev-
enteenth century, extradition treaties were primarily concerned
with political and religious offenders, and were least concerned
with common criminals.3 ' This was because states that had
strong ties with each other had reciprocal interests in surrender-
ing persons who threatened the stability of each state's political
order.3 2 However, the scope of extradition treaties began to
evolve.
Due to international efforts aimed at combating piracy be-
27. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW 885 (2d ed.
1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT]; for a definition of the
term "extradition," see M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER 5-10 (1974) [hereinafter M. BASSIOUNI].
28. International law only recognizes a legal right to demand extradition and the
reciprocal duty to surrender the fugitive where treaties are entered. G. VON GLAHN, LAW
AMONG NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 263 (4th ed. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter G. VON GLAHN]. Therefore, it is possible that state A may voluntarily surrender a
fugitive to state B where no extradition treaty has been entered, however, state B has no
legal right to request that state A extradite the fugitive for a crime committed in state B.
See generally id. A state may also extradite based on reciprocity or comity. M. BAS-
SIOUNI, supra note 27, at 8, 59-61. "Although most [methods of extradition] are based on
bilateral agreements, in the absence of a generally accepted convention on the subject
there has come into being sufficient similarity in state practices to support the view that
by now a series of customary rules has developed or that the rules are in the final stages
of development." G. VON GLAHN, at 262.
29. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 27, at 324-30. The treaties which provide for extradi-
tion where the offense committed is a crime punishable in both countries that are the
parties to the treaties originated in the twentieth century. Id. at 324-35.
30. Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties
in Anglo-American Jurisprudence, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61, 63 (1979) [hereinafter Epps,
Political Offender Exception].
31. Id. at 62; M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 27, at 7.
32. Petty crimes did not threaten the internal political order of a state and, until
the 1800s, extradition was directed at maintaining the stability of the political system of
the requesting state. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 27, at 4.
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tween the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, the scope of extra-
dition treaties gradually expanded to include ordinary crimes as
one of the bases for extradition.3 3 As modes of transportation
became more sophisticated, criminals were able to quickly flee
from the jurisdictions where they had committed their crimes.-4
Thus, general extradition treaties were developed in order to
deal with criminal offenders. 5 Political and religious offenses
were no longer the primary concern of extradition treaties and
eventually political offenses were no longer a basis for the sur-
render of fugitives.36
During the end of the eighteenth century, concern for the
political offender arose as representative forms of government
took shape and sovereigns began to accept political theories
based on individualism and the right to rebel against oppressive
forms of government. 7 In response to this growing concern, the
Belgians and French, in their joint extradition treaty of 1834,
explicitly excluded political offenders from extradition. 8 In
1843, the treaty between the United States and France became
the first extradition treaty into which the United States entered
that included a political offense exception.3 9 By the end of the
nineteenth century the political offense exception had become a
standard clause in all United States extradition treaties. 40 The
underlying basis for including the political offense exception in
extradition treaties were the concepts of freedom, individualism,
and democracy. Indeed, the exception itself was closely linked to
the concept of political asylum. 1
B. Extradition Procedure
There is a standard procedure for extradition which is gen-
33. M. BASSIoUNI, supra note 27, at 7.
34. Modern international cooperation began in the 1900s in order to suppress crime.
Before the advancement of travel, conditions were perilous and transport was difficult.
Further, the stranger was not well received and sanctuary in a new place was not certain.
A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 7 (1971) [hereinafter A. SHEARER].
35. Id. at 6-8.
36. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 27, at 4; see also A. SHEARER, supra note 34, at 6 n.4.
37. Epps, Political Offender Exception, supra note 30, at 63; see Lubet, Extradition
Reform, supra note 18, at 248-49.
38. Epps, Political Offender, supra note 30, at 63 (citing Extradition Treaty be-
tween Belgium and France, Nov. 22, 1834, art. 5, 84 Parry's T.S. 457, 462).
39. Epps, supra note 30, at 63 (citing Treaty of Extradition between the United
States and France, Nov. 9, 1843, art. 4, 8 Stat. 580, T.S. No. 89).
40. Epps, Political Offender Exception, supra note 30, at 63.
41. Lubet, Extradition Reform, supra note 18, at 250-51.
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erally followed by states that have extradition treaties.42 First, a
formal request for extradition must be made by a diplomatic
agent of the state that seeks the surrender of a fugitive.43 The
country that has been requested to extradite the fugitive com-
mences an investigation through its judicial branch to determine
whether there is sufficient evidence under its own laws to war-
rant their arrest.44 If there is sufficient evidence which meets the
local law requirements, the fugitive is turned over to the agents
of the state that requested extradition and is then returned to
the country seeking custody.45 When the fugitive is returned to
the jurisdiction of the requesting state he or she may only be
tried for the offense that served as the basis for extradition.46
In the United States, a state requesting extradition can not
appeal an unfavorable decision regarding extradition to a higher
court.47 However, a state may refile its extradition request before
another trial court.48 Similarly, the defendant may not appeal an
adverse decision, but may file a writ of habeas corpus which is
42. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 28, at 264. "Although extradition treaties vary consid-
erably as regards the offenses listed in them as the basis of surrender, the actual proce-
dure utilized in extradition has been standardized fairly well all over the world." Id.; see
generally L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 27, at 885-90.
43. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 28, at 264.
44. G. vON GLAHN, supra note 28, at 264.
45. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 28, at 264. Because of the possibility of a fugitive
leaving a current place of refuge upon learning of the threat of extradition proceedings,
most treaties provide for the provisional arrest of fugitives after an informal request for
extradition. Id. at 265. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3187 (1988) which states:
The provisional arrest and detention of a fugitive . . . in advance of the
presentation of formal proofs, may be obtained by telegraph upon the request
of authority competent to request the surrender of such fugitive addressed to
the authority competent to grant such surrender. Such request shall be accom-
panied by an express statement that a warrant for the fugitive's arrest has
been issued within the jurisdiction of the authority making such request charg-
ing the fugitive with the commission of the crime for which his extradition is
sought to be obtained.
This provision restricts the amount of time the fugitive can be held in custody upon
telegraphic request to ninety days. 18 U.S.C. § 3187 (1988).
46. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 28, at 265. This has been referred to as the principle
of specialty.
According to the principle of specialty the requisitioning state may not,
without the permission of the asylum state, try or punish the fugitive for any
crimes committed before the extradition except the crimes for which he was
extradited. The permission of the asylum state is also required to re-extradite
the fugitive to a third state.
L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 27, at 889.
47. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 27 at 890.
48. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 27, at 890. See M.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 27, at 608.
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appealable to higher federal courts.49 This relatively simple pro-
cess is complicated when a fugitive terrorist claims to be a politi-
cal offender exempt from extradition under the political offense
exception. The uncertain legislative history of the political of-
fense exception and inconsistent case law reflect the indecisive-
ness in the area of the political offense exception.
C. Political Offenses
Traditionally, political offenses fall into two categories: (1)
pure political offenses; 0 and (2) relative political offensesM1
There has been little litigation concerning pure political offenses
committed against a government.52 Pure political offenses con-
sist of direct acts committed against a state and include such
acts as treason, sedition, and espionage.53 Such offenses are
meant to be vehicles for carrying out the expression of political
ideas, they generally do not incite violence, and thus lack the
elements of common crimes.54 As demonstrated by the Belgian
and French extradition treaties, and later in United States trea-
ties, pure political offenders are the primary targets that the po-
litical offense exception seeks to protect.5
The majority of cases regarding the applicability of the po-
litical offense exception concern relative political offenses which
are actions motivated by political reasons and carried out
through common crimes. 6 Acts of terrorists are generally indis-
criminate forms of violence that do not immediately affect gov-
ernmental structure. Thus, terrorism falls under the definition
of relative political offenses rather than that of pure political of-
fenses. Because relative political offenses involve both the ele-
ments of common crimes and the elements of a political offense,
49. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, supra note 27, at 890.
50. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
52. J. MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICY INITIATIVES 47 (1985) [hereinafter J. MURPHY].
53. Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offenses Excep-
tion in Extradition - A Proposed Judicial Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DE
PAUL L. REV. 217, 245-48 (1969) [hereinafter Bassiouni, Political Offenses; J. MURPHY,
supra note 52, at 47.
54. Bassiouni, Political Offenses, supra note 53, at 245-58; J. MURPHY, supra note
52, at 46.
55. Epps, Political Offender Exception, supra note 30, at 63.
56. Bassiouni, Political Offenses, supra note 53, at 248; J. MURPHY, supra note 52,
at 47.
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the courts have developed specific tests to determine whether a
particular act should be afforded protection under the political
offense exception, or whether the act should be deemed a com-
mon crime and therefore extraditable.
57
D. The Political Offense Exception Tests
There are two tests that United States courts use in order to
determine the applicability of the political offense exception to a
fugitive during extradition proceedings. 8 These tests, the inci-
dence test and the proportionality or predominance test, both
attempt to draw a line between the offenses that deserve the
protection of the political offense exception and the offenses
which do not deserve the protection of the political offense
exception.
5 9
In determining the applicability of the political offense ex-
ception in extradition cases, courts have generally relied on two
nineteenth century English cases 0 which focused on whether
there was an uprising or violent political disturbance at the time
the act was committed, and whether the offense committed was
incidental to the uprising.6 1 This analysis has been labeled the
"incidence test" and generally provides that an accused is not
57. Bassiouni, Political Offenses, supra note 53, at 248-54; J. MURPHY, supra note
52, at 47-48.
58. Goldie, The "Political Offense" Exception and Extradition Between Demo-
cratic States, 13 OHIo N.U.L. REV. 53, 67-75 [hereinafter Goldie, Extradition]; In Re
Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.
1981).
59. Goldie, Extradition, supra note 58, at 62.
60. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. G. VON GLAHN, supra note 28, at 270-71 (citing
In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415). "The decision in In re Meunier began a trend by the
British courts towards narrowing the sweep of the political offender exception." Epps,
Political Offender Exception, supra note 30, at 65. In Meunier, the French Government
requested the extradition of Meunier, a French citizen, from Great Britain. Meunier had
been accused by the French of two bombings in France linked to an anarchist movement.
Meunier sought reliance on Castioni to prevent his extradition on the basis that his acts
constituted a political offense. However, the English court permitted his extradition on
the grounds that Meunier's acts lacked a sufficient connection to a political incidence or
uprising. Specifically, the court noted the absence of a struggle among two or more par-
ties in the French state seeking to establish a government of its choice and added that
the goal of the anarchist movement of which Meunier was a part of was to abolish all
governments rather than to create one. Moreover, the court ruled that anarchist offenses
directed at private citizens fell outside of the meaning of the political offense exception
notwithstanding the secondary or incidental effects upon a government. Epps, Political
Offender Exception, supra note 30, at 65; Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 796 (9th Cir.
1986).
61. Lubet, Extradition Reform, supra note 18, at 262.
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subject to extradition if the act was committed in connection
with a political uprising or disturbance.2
Most recently, the incidence test has been applied in cases
involving terrorists who are members of the Irish Republican
Army (IRA). 3 Some courts have been hesitant in finding certain
members of the IRA who engage in terrorist activities extradita-
ble to the United Kingdom, and because of mechanical and in-
flexible application of the incidence test, these courts afford
them protection under the political offense exception. 4
Somewhat related to the incidence test is the proportional-
ity test which finds its roots in Swiss case law. 5 In addition to a
direct connection between the offence and advancement of a po-
litical goal, the political elements of the act must outweigh the
common crime elements, or be proportional to the political ends
sought.6 Recent extradition cases in United States courts have
adopted the proportionality test in determining the applicability
of the political offense exception to an IRA member 67 and Pales-
tinian terrorists.6 8
In the past, United States courts have generally relied on
the incidence test, but more recently, courts have utilized the
proportionality or predominance test to determine the applica-
bility of the political offense exception to terrorists.69 The prob-
lem is that there has been little uniformity in how United States
courts have applied the offense exception to terrorists. The fol-
lowing analysis of recent United States case law demonstrates
this fundamental lack of uniformity.
62. Lubet, Extradition Reform, supra note 13, at 262; Goldie, Extradition, supra
note 58, at 66.
63. See Epps, Political Offender Exception, supra note 30, at 64.
64. See infra notes 71-111 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 112-35 and accompanying text; Goldie, Extradition, supra note
58, at 63-64.
66. Goldie, Extradition, supra note 58, at 63-64.
67. In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See infra notes 113-24 and
accompanying text.
68. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981); see infra notes 125-34 and accom-
panying text.
69. See infra notes 112-76 and accompanying text. There is a third test, called the
"objective test," that was developed and is used by the French judiciary. The political
motivation of the offender is not considered, and the court looks solely at whether the
state or its political organizations have been injured. Thus, the objective test recognizes




Recent cases in United States courts have inconsistently ap-
plied the political offense exception to terrorists. While the
courts have adopted specific tests to determine whether or not a
particular defendant is extraditable, the standards have been
adapted to meet the desired ends of particular cases. What has
resulted from the uncertainty surrounding the political offense
exception are lengthy opinions which have generated much criti-
cism regarding the application of the political offense exception
to terrorists. 0
A. The Incidence Test
United States courts first followed the British courts in ap-
plying the "incidence test" to determine whether the political
offense exception applied to a defendant in extradition proceed-
ings.71 This test looks at whether there is an uprising or political
disturbance, and then determines whether the act was incidental
to the uprising.72 Both of these aspects of the test must be satis-
fied in order for the exception to apply. The "incidence test" has
been mechanically and inflexibly applied where the United
Kingdom has requested that the United States extradite ter-
rorists belonging to the IRA. Generally, the courts have held
that members of the IRA are nonextraditable. 3 Three recent
IRA cases which have employed the "incidence test" are In re
McMullen,7 4 In re Mackin,75 and Quinn v. Robinson.7
6
In In re McMullen, a member of the Provisional Wing of
the Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was involved in the bombing
of British military barracks in Great Britain which killed off
duty soldiers.7 McMullen, who had fled to the United States,
was accused of murder by the British Government.7 s The United
Kingdom filed a request for extradition with the United States
70. See generally Lubet, Extradition Reform, supra note 18.
71. See Lubet, Extradition Reform, supra note 18, at 262.
72. Lubet, Extradition Reform, supra note 18, at 262.
73. See infra notes 77-110 and accompanying text.
74. No. 3-78-1099 M.G. (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979) (Mem.) (unreported).
75. No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981) (unreported), affd, United States v.
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
76. C-82-6688 R.P.A. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1983) (unreported), vacated and remanded,
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
77. McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 M.G. slip op. at 1-2.
78. Id.
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pursuant to the United States-United Kingdom Extradition
Treaty. 9
At the extradition hearing, the magistrate applied the "inci-
dence test" to the specific facts of the case. The court found that
there was sufficient evidence to establish that a political uprising
existed in Northern Ireland.s0 Furthermore, the court found that
the uprising had spread to Great Britain and therefore, even
though it was an isolated act on that particular day, the bomb-
ing was incidental to an ongoing political uprising.8 1 Addition-
ally, the court found that McMullen was a member of the PIRA
at the time the offense was committed and that his orders came
from the organization's authorities, thus establishing that Mc-
Mullen's acts were politically motivated.82 Therefore, because
the two prongs of the "incidence test" were satisfied, the court
concluded that, regardless of the heinous nature of the offense,
McMullen's acts fell within the political offense exception and
that he could not be extradited. 3
In re Mackin added another prong to the "incidence test."
In addition to the two traditional prongs of the incidence test,
the court asked whether the defendant was a member of the
group responsible for the political disturbance.8 4 In this case,
Mackin was indicted in Northern Ireland on various charges in-
cluding the attempted murder and wounding of a British soldier
with intent to do grievous bodily harm.85 These charges
stemmed from a battle in Belfast, Northern Ireland between
British troops and members of the PIRA."8 Mackin was arrested
and released on bail at which time he fled to, and illegally en-
tered, the United States.87 Subsequently, he was apprehended
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service.88 The United
Kingdom requested that the United States extradite Mackin
pursuant to the United States-United Kingdom Extradition
79. United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
80. McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 M.G. slip op. at 3.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Id.
84. In re Mackin, 688 F.2d 122, 125 (2nd Cir. 1981).
85. Id. at 124.
86. Id. at 125.




Treaty.89 The case was assigned to an extradition magistrate to
ascertain whether there was sufficient evidence to arrest and ex-
tradite Mackin.90
The court went through an incidence test analysis similar to
the McMullen court and determined that there was an uprising
in Northern Ireland at the time the offense was committed, and
that this particular conflict was connected to the overall political
disturbance in Northern Ireland. 91 Unlike McMullen, however,
Mackin's offense took place in Northern Ireland and therefore
the court did not have to determine whether the disturbance ex-
tended to Great Britain. Additionally, the court found that
Mackin's involvement in the PIRA satisfied the additional ele-
ment the court added to the incidence test because his actions
were consistent with those of other members, and because the
PIRA was directly involved in the furtherance of the uprising.2
Thus, the court concluded that Mackin was a member of the
group responsible for the political disturbance. Finally, the court
determined that Mackin's alleged offense furthered the goals of
the PIRA and was incidental to the political disturbance in
Northern Ireland.93 Therefore, the court found that Mackin was
not extraditable because the "incidence test" was satisfied.
9 4
Quinn v. Robinson95 demonstrates how the courts have
modified and manipulated the incidence test to achieve specific
desired results. In Quinn the United Kingdom sought the extra-
dition of Quinn, a United States citizen and a member of the
PIRA, for the murder of a British Police Constable and his in-
volvement in a conspiracy to commit bombing attacks against
civilians. 6 Initially, a United States magistrate, using the
Mackin interpretation of the incidence test, found Quinn to be
extraditable.17 The magistrate determined that there was an up-
rising in Northern Ireland which extended to Great Britain. 8
However, the magistrate found that Quinn failed to meet the
89. Id. at 123-24.
90. Id. at 123.




95. 783 F.2d, 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
96. C-82-6688 R.P.A. (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1983) (unreported), vacated and remanded,
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986).
97. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 810-11.
98. Id. at 810.
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second prong of the "incidence test" because he failed to estab-
lish that the PIRA ordered the bombings in furtherance of its
political goals, and thus the murder of the Police Constable was
not incidental to the uprising. 9
Quinn was successful in petitioning the district court for a
writ of habeas corpus and the court reversed his extradition,
holding that the political offense exception applied.100 In addi-
tion, the district court found that the magistrate had applied er-
roneous legal standards in coming to the conclusion that Quinn
was extraditable. 11'
The United States Government, on behalf of the United
Kingdom, appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit which affirmed the district court's decision.1 02
First, the court determined that the incidence test did not re-
quire the accused to prove his political motivations.' 0 3 Nor did it
require that he establish that the acts were done in furtherance
of the goals of the organization or that the acts were ordered by
its leaders. 10 4 Additionally, the court said that the incidence test
did not require that the accused prove his membership in an
organization connected to the uprising.'05 Therefore, the court
concluded that in order to determine whether a particular act is
a political offense, the magistrate need only look at the tradi-
tional two prong incidence test.'0 6
Focusing on the specific facts of this case, the court of ap-
peals limited the aspect of the test which looks at whether there
was a political uprising or disturbance. 10 7 It determined that al-
though an uprising did exist in Northern Ireland at the time of
the incidents, the uprising did not extend to Great Britain.108
Thus, the offenses did not take place within the geographical lo-
cation where the existing political structure was to be affected.'09
Therefore, the court concluded that in order for an offense to be
properly protected under the political offense exception, it must
99. Id. at 811.
100. Id. at 781.
101. Id. at 811.
102. Id. at 781.




107. Id. at 811-12.
108. Id. at 813.
109. Id. at 807, 813.
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take place in the area where nationals are seeking to change the
form of government.1 0
While the decision of the court of appeals reinstates the
"original" two prong incidence test, it also states that interna-
tional terrorists do not meet the test."' The Ninth Circuit's in-
consistencies with the district court and the magistrate's appli-
cation of the incidence test illustrate the confusion surrounding
the political offense exception as well as the incidence test. A
straightforward application of the incidence test is not flexible
enough to afford protection to those who commit political acts
not readily attributable to a general uprising. Further, such
straightforward application fails to exclude from its protection
those who commit atrocities against civilians or those who em-
ploy the indiscriminate use of violence during political rebellion.
Thus, the potential abuse in the application of the political of-
fense exception can be, and has been, increased through the use
of the incidence test.
B. The Proportionality Test
United States courts have also used the proportionality test
to determine whether or not an accused should be afforded the
protection of the political offense exception. The proportionality
test, in addition to determining whether an uprising exists and if
an act was done in furtherance of the uprising, looks at whether
the political elements of the act predominate over the criminal
elements. 1 2 Two recent cases which have used the proportional-
ity test are In re Doherty"' and Eain v. Wilkes."4
Doherty concerned a member of the PIRA who, at the di-
rection of the IRA, attacked a convoy of British soldiers in Bel-
fast, Northern Ireland." 5 The attack resulted in a battle in
which a British army captain was killed. Doherty was arrested
110. Id. at 807. The court expressly reserved any decision as to whether Quinn's
status as a citizen of an uninvolved nation would preclude him from the protections
afforded by the political offense exception as well. Id. at 807. The court also concluded
that acts of international terrorism are not covered by the political offense exception
because these offenses do not meet the prerequisites of the incidence test. Id. at 807,
813-14.
111. Id. at 813-14.
112. Goldie, Extradition, supra note 58, at 63-64.
113. 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
114. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
115. Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 272.
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and charged with murder.116 After his trial but before a verdict
was reached he escaped from prison.117 He was convicted in ab-
sentia of murder and other offenses."l 8 Doherty fled to the
United States and was arrested by the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service."19 The United Kingdom requested his extradi-
tion from the United States, and the case was assigned to an
extradition magistrate.
20
The court first determined that satisfying the two prong in-
cidence test is merely the beginning of the analysis because
these two prongs alone are overinclusive. 12' The court then an-
nounced that in order for an act to not be regarded as political
in nature it must be "violative of international law and inconsis-
tent with international standards of civilized conduct.' 22 In
coming to the conclusion that Doherty's acts were political and
that he was not extraditable, the court considered the structure
of the PIRA. 23 It determined that the PIRA had the discipline
and command structure of a legitimate organization and found it
unnecessary to assess the likelihood of the political movement's
success.124 In sum, the court found that the political elements of
the offense were predominant over the criminal elements.
Conversely, in Eain v. Wilkes, 26 the court found that the
criminal elements of the offense committed predominated the
political elements.'26 Eain, a member of the Al Fatah branch of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), was accused of
placing a bomb in a crowded market area in Israel which ex-
ploded and caused the death of two young boys and injured
thirty other people. 27 Shortly after the bombing, Eain, a resi-
dent of the West Bank area of the Jordan River, traveled to the
United States. 28 Israel requested that the United States extra-






121. Id. at 274.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 276.
124. Id.
125. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
126. Id.




two countries.129 A United States magistrate determined that
Eain could be extradited to Israel to stand trial for murder and
causing bodily harm with aggravating intent."3 0 Eain sought a
writ of habeas corpus which was denied by the district court.13s
The court of appeals affirmed.'32
In addition to addressing the two prongs of the incidence
test, the court of appeals was concerned with the military or ci-
vilian status of the victims of the offense. 33 The court deter-
mined that a bombing directed at civilians rather than at the
government was not incidental to a political disturbance and did
not warrant the protection of the political offense exception.13 4
Additionally, the court directly addressed the problem of mod-
ern day terrorism and the ills of allowing terrorists to seek safe
haven in the United States.1
3 5
While the predominance test is more flexible than the inci-
dence test, it is open for abuse because it gives the judiciary the
task of determining if a given political objective is legitimate. It
hardly seems appropriate for a court to pass judgment on either
the political structure of a foreign government, or the legitimacy
of a political movement to change an existing form of govern-
ment. It seems evident from the existing case law that courts
have either limited or broadened the prongs of the incidence test
in order to effectuate a specific result. In re Extradition of
Atta131 follows this development of modifying the tests used to
determine the applicability of the political offense exception in
order to produce a result which is both desirable and consistent
with recent efforts to combat terrorism.
IV. In Re Atta: FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On April 12, 1986, three members of the Abu Nidal Organi-




132. Id. at 522.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 520-21.
135. Id. at 520.
136. 706 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
137. The Abu Nidal Organization (also known as Fatah Revolutionary Council, Arab
Revolutionary Council, Arab Revolutionary Brigades, Black September, Revolutionary
Organization of Socialist Muslims) is currently based in Libya and Lebanon, and is forti-
fied with several hundred members. It split from the PLO in 1974, and since then has
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on its way to Tel Aviv.1 8' The attack occurred near the Dir Abu
Mishal Intersection in the West Bank of the Occupied Territo-
ries of Israel.13 9 Molotov cocktails were launched at the bus
which was also attacked with the open fire of Uzi sub-machine
guns. 1 40 Of the three passengers on the bus, one was struck by
shrapnel while the other two passengers were not injured.114 The
driver of the bus was fatally injured.
142
Subsequently, two Palestinians were apprehended by Israeli
authorities and tried and convicted for their participation in the
attack.143 In the statements they made while in custody, these
two men implicated the defendant as the third member of the
Abu Nidal Organization who participated in the attack.144 The
defendant, Mahmoud El-Abed Ahmad (also known as Atta),45
left the West Bank after the April 12th attack and a year later
Israeli authorities discovered that he was living in Venezuela.
1 46
Atta was detained in Venezuela on charges connected with his
involvement with the Abu Nidal Organization, and on May 6,
1987, was deported to the United States, his place of citizen-
ship.147 A United States magistrate issued a warrant for the pro-
visional arrest of Ahmad and Federal Bureau of Investigations
agents executed the warrant during Ahmad's flight from Caracas
to the United States. 48
Israel formally requested that the United States extradite
Atta on June 26, 1987. 14 He was charged with murder, at-
carried out at least 90 terrorist attacks in 20 countries. They are responsible for the
injuries and deaths of nearly 900 people. "Major attacks include: Rome and Vienna air-
ports in December 1985. . .and the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi in Septem-
ber 1986." Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, supra note 2, at 41.
138. Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1034.
139. Id.
140. The "Molotov cocktails" were prepared from petrol, diesel and tar. In the Mat-
ter of the Extradition of Atta, No. 87-M-0551 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988) (WESTLAW
66866 at 3).
141. Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1034.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1035.
144. Id.
145. In the Matter of Extradition of Atta, No. 87-M-0551 (E.D.N.Y. 1988)
(WESTLAW 66866 at 22 n.1).
146. In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
147. Atta, No. 87-M-0551 at 18.
148. Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1035. Atta could not be extradited from Venezuela to
Israel because Venezuela does not have an extradition treaty with Israel. Therefore, Ven-
ezuela agreed to deport Atta to the United States, Atta's place of citizenship so that the
United States could have an extradition hearing for him. Id. at 1037.
149. Id. at 1035.
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tempted murder, causing harm with aggravated intent, arson,
and conspiracy to commit a felony which are all violations of the
Israeli Penal Law. 50 These crimes also fall within Article II of
the United States-Israel convention on extradition.15 The con-
vention is a reciprocal agreement between the United States and
Israel to extradite persons found within their territory who have
been charged with or convicted of an offense described in Article
11.152
The United States filed an extradition complaint in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York. On June 17, 1988 the extradition request was denied by
the magistrate. 153 The magistrate, applying the incidence test,
labeled the attack as political thereby excluding Atta from ex-
tradition."" Additionally, the magistrate stated that Atta could
150. Id.
151. United States-Israel Extradition Treaty, supra note 24. The offenses listed in
Article II include in relevant part: "1. Murder; 2. Manslaughter; 3. Malicious Wounding;
inflicting grievous bodily harm; 24. Arson; 25. Any malicious act done with intent to
endanger the safety of any person travelling upon a railway; 27. Malicious injury to
property."
Article II further provides that:
Extradition shall be granted for any of the offenses numbered 27 through
31 only if the offense is punishable under the laws of both Parties by a term of
imprisonment exceeding three years.
Extradition shall also be granted for attempts to commit or conspiracy to
commit any of the offenses mentioned in this article provided such attempts or
such conspiracy are punishable under the laws of both Parties by a term of
imprisonment exceeding three years.
Extradition shall also be granted for the participation in any of the of-
fenses mentioned in this Article.
Id.
152. United States-Israel Extradition Treaty, supra note 24. The offense must have
been committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting Party; if the offense
was committed outside of the territorial jurisdiction then it must fall within Article III of
the Convention in order to be extraditable. Id.
Article III states in part: "When the offense has been committed outside the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the requesting Party, extradition need not be granted unless the laws
of the requested Party provide for the Punishment of such an offense committed in simi-
lar circumstances." Id. at art. III. In the first extradition hearing Ahmad argued that his
acts were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of Israel, however, Israel claimed
jurisdiction over Ahmad through the Penal Law of Israel, 5737-1977 section 7(a), which
gives Israel authority to try a person under Israeli law if the offense, had it been commit-
ted in Israel, "was intended to injure the life, person, health, freedom or property of an
Israeli national or resident." Atta, No. 87-M-0551 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988) (WESTLAW
66866 at 3). This jurisdictional issue was not brought up again in the second extradition
hearing. In the Matter of Extradition of Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
153. Id. at 1035.
154. Id.
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not be certified for extradition because he was not legally
brought into the United States and therefore the court did not
have jurisdiction over him.
155
In accordance with United States federal law, a second ex-
tradition complaint was then filed by the United States Attor-
ney.'56 A new extradition magistrate was appointed for a de novo
hearing and each party was permitted to bring in additional wit-
nesses to supplement the record.1
5 7
Initially, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
jected the jurisdictional holding of the magistrate finding Atta
had not been illegally deported to the United States from Vene-
zuela.158 According to United States law and Article I of the
United States-Israel Extradition Treaty, jurisdiction may be ex-
ercised over anyone "found" in the United States regardless of
how the person enters the country.1
59
The heart of the court's opinion focused on the applicability
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1036.
157. Id. Judge Korman, sitting as an extradition magistrate in the second hearing,
said that even if there were no additional witnesses and the case had to be decided upon
the record from the first extradition hearing, the denial of extradition would have to be
reversed because erroneous legal standards were applied by the magistrate, and the find-
ings of fact were erroneous. Id. at 1036, 1052.
Atta filed a writ of habeas corpus claiming that the alleged crime was barred by the
principle of double jeopardy, that insufficient probable cause was shown and that he
would not receive due process from the courts of Israel. In the Matter of the Petition of
Mahmoud El-Abed Ahmad, No. 89-CV-715, (E.D.N.Y. September 26, 1989) (Lexis 11454
at 4-5).
The due process issue was not raised by Judge Korman's hearing and the petition
was referred to Judge Weinstein, who, on May 16, 1989 ruled that he would consider the
due process claim. On June 20, 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit denied the government's request for a writ of mandamus to bar the court from
holding a hearing on Israeli judicial procedures. On September 26, 1989, Judge Wein-
stein, in upholding the extradition findings of Judge Korman and in determining that
Atta would receive a fair trail in Israel, dismissed the petition for the writ of habeas
corpus. Id. at 5, 6, 90.
158. In the Matter of Extradition Atta, No. 87-M-0551 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988)
(WESTLAW 66866); Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1038. The last part of the opinion deals with
the sufficiency of evidence, the defendant's last argument. Judge Korman found that the
accomplice's testimony created probable cause. Id. at 1050. Additionally, Judge Korman
noted that a jury does not have to disregard a confession which was coerced, but the jury
could determine what weight they want to give such a confession. Id. at 1051-52; see also
United States v. Daley, 865 F.2d 485, 492 (2d Cir. 1989).
159. Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1036-37. The court explained that the United States "did
everything possible to encourage Venezuela to deport him to Israel rather than the
United States." Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1988); United States-Israel Extradition Treaty,
supra note 24.
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of the political offense exception to Atta.16 0 The analysis re-
viewed the inconsistent case law in this area and additionally
looked to the State Department's recommendations.161 The
State Department took the view that the indiscriminate use of
violence is not to be considered a political offense.162 This posi-
tion is responsive to the current threat of terrorism on world
peace.1
6 3
The court discussed the ramifications of viewing the politi-
cal offense exception in its broadest sense.6 4 The "broad view"
of the political offense exception claims that "any atrocity, if po-
litically motivated, is a political act."' 65 This view of the political
offense exception, while preserving neutrality, does not take into
account the nature of the act. 6 The court pointed out that it is
the requested party who must determine whether the act is of a
political nature, and this determination is "inherently qualita-
tive" and there is no reason why it should be made "without
reference to 'our notions of civilized strife.' "1167 Thus, the court
concluded that not all politically motivated acts, particularly
those which are violent in nature, should be afforded the protec-
tion of the political offense exception.
The court then addressed the consequences of rejecting the
broad view of the exception. Relying on Matter of Doherty as
being representative of the cases which do not follow the broad
view the court stated, ". . . [s]urely an act which would be prop-
erly punishable even in the context of a declared war or in the
heat of open military conflict cannot and should not receive rec-
ognition under the political exception to the treaty."'6 8 The
court stated that these rules of engagement provide a neutral
standard which aids in the determination of what acts are justi-
fiable in armed conflict. 6 9 Using the Doherty analysis the court
concluded that Atta's actions did not constitute a political
offense.
17
160. Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1038-50.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1039 n.5.
163. See Bremer, Countering Terrorism, supra note 1, at 62.
164. Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1040-41.
165. Id. at 1042.
166. Id. at 1041.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1042.
169. Id. at 1044-45.
170. Id. at 1047.
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In connection with the rules of engagement, the court ad-
dressed the distinction between military personnel and objects
and civilians and civilian objects. 17 '1 The court determined that
the passenger bus was not a legitimate military target.172 It also
found that not all settlers on the West Bank were part of the
Israeli military.
1 7 3
Even if the attack on the bus was considered a political act,
the court stated that there must also be a conflict of sufficient
magnitude so that the settlers living on the West Bank could be
characterized as military.17 4 Based upon the overwhelming evi-
dence, the court concluded that the violent attacks at that time
were not so frequent that an uprising of sufficient magnitude
was created. As a result, the court stated that Magistrate
Caden's finding that there was an uprising at the time was erro-
neous.175 Lastly, the court declared that if murder is to be re-
garded as a political offense because the accused claims a politi-
cal motivation, or believes that the victims lack political




It is unlikely that the development of the political offense
exception anticipated modern day terrorism, or its inclusion
therein. The varied decisions in extradition cases regarding ter-
rorists suggest the need for reform.177 In re Atta moves toward
narrowing the definition of "political offense" by using the pro-
portionality test and focusing on the rules of engagement to de-
termine what acts are justifiable in armed conflict. However, be-
cause the application of the exception in the past has led to the
nonextraditability of terrorists, it does not seem reasonable to
assume that the courts will immediately conform to the views
expressed in Atta.
Since courts do not all apply the same test in cases where
171. Id. at 1042-47.
172. Id. at 1043.
173. Id: 1044-45.
174. Id. at 1047-50.
175. Id. at 1049. At the time of the attack there was not an uprising on the West
Bank. In fact, the attack occurred on April 12, 1986, and the Palestinian uprising (the
Intifada), that today would most likely constitute an uprising of a sufficient magnitude,
did not begin until December 9, 1987. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1989, §6 (Magazine), at 36.
176. Atta, 706 F. Supp. at 1050.
177. See supra notes 55-176 and accompanying text.
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the political offense exception to extradition is invoked, the de-
cisions will remain inconsistent.17 8 Atta, as well as previous case
law, demonstrates that depending on whether the incidence test
or the proportionality test is applied to a given set of facts, the
outcome of the case can be different. In the first extradition
hearing for Atta, where the incidence test was employed, the
court concluded that Atta was not extraditable." 9 However,
when the petition for extradition was refiled the court utilized
the proportionality test and, essentially with the same set of
facts, the court concluded that Atta was extraditable. 180 This il-
lustrates that the courts do not feel bound by one test over the
other, and that while both of these tests are being applied, it is
impossible to adequately define what constitutes a political
offense.
Another problem that arises in the relation to extradition
cases is that even if the courts adopt the same test, the existing
tests are not satisfactory. The incidence test is too inflexible and
its straightforward application is both under and over inclusive.
As seen in McMullen, Mackin, and Quinn, if a legitimate politi-
cal act is not readily attributable to a general uprising, then it
will not be protected by the political offense exception.' 8' Thus,
the incidence test is under inclusive because it does not afford
the protection of asylum to those with legitimate political goals.
Furthermore, the incidence test is over inclusive because it af-
fords protection to those who use indiscriminate forms of vio-
lence during a political uprising.
The proportionality test relies on the court's discretion in
determining the legitimacy of a particular political movement.1
82
Thus, the court will be making policy decisions that are better
left to the executive and legislative branches of government.
Moreover, if the court must make this type of determination, it
will be subject to external political pressures and, as a result,
will no longer be a neutral decision making body. However, it is
important to exclude terrorists from the political offense excep-
tion, and, to that end, an understanding of the purposes behind
the exception is helpful.
178. See supra notes 51-176 and accompanying text.
179. In the Matter of Extradition of Atta, No. 87-M-0551 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988)
(WESTLAW 66866).
180. In re Atta, 706 F. Supp. 1032.
181. See supra notes 71-111 and accompanying text (on incidence test).
182. See supra notes 112-76 and accompanying text (on proportional test).
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The basic philosophy behind the political offense exception
can be viewed as protecting three interests within the extradi-
tion process: (1) the rights of the accused; (2) the interests of
both the state requesting extradition and the state which has
custody of the accused; (3) and the concern for international
public order.""s The political offense exception protects the
rights of the accused by requiring the state that has custody of
the accused to determine whether the accused will receive a fair
trial by the state that requested extradition.18 4 Therefore, by re-
viewing the possible treatment that the state requesting extradi-
tion will afford the accused, the accused's interests will remain
protected. The second interest to be protected is that of the two
states involved in the extradition process.18 5 This has been re-
ferred to as the principle of neutrality. 8 6 If the requested state
had to review the extraditability of a pure political crime, it
would be making a valuation of the internal political structure of
the requesting state and could well be viewed as meddling into
the affairs of that state. 8 7 Additionally, because the political of-
fenders of today can become the leaders of tomorrow, the politi-
cal offense exception allows the United States to remain some-
what neutral, and not intervene in the domestic affairs of foreign
states. 88 The issue becomes more complex when terrorists are
involved because while they are trying to evoke political change
through their actions, it is difficult not to make a judgment on
the methods that they use. The exception also protects national
sovereignty and the exclusive jurisdiction a state has over those
people within its territory. 89
International public order is also protected by the political
offense exception. Theoretically, political offenders are trying to
force change of an internal goverrimental structure which is not
of concern to international public order. Because political of-
fenses should have no effect beyond the borders of the states in
which they seek to evoke governmental change, the state which
has been requested to extradite an accused has no immediate
183. J. MURPHY, supra note 52, at 45.
184. J. MURPHY, supra note 52, at 45.
185. Epps, Political Offender Exception, supra note 30, at 63; J. MURPHY, supra
note 52, at 46.
186. J. MURPHY, supra note 52, at 45.
187. J. MURPHY, supra note 52, at 46.
188. J. MURPHY, supra note 52, at 46.
189. J. MURPHY, supra note 52, at 46.
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interest in seeing the suppression of political crimes. 9 ' This
analysis falls short where terrorists are involved because their
acts of violence often have effects on world order, and there is an
international interest in preventing violent crimes.
After viewing these three rationale for the political offense
exception, it is inappropriate that terrorist activities be afforded
the protection that the exception supplies. It has also been
shown that the courts have not been able to consistently keep
terrorists from successfully invoking the political offense excep-
tion. Accordingly, it seems that the only way to effectively nar-
row the scope of the political offense exception to exclude terror-
ist activities is limit it through the legislature.
Legislative reform can come in a variety of ways. One
method is to change the existing treaties already in force indi-
vidually. A good example of this is the Supplementary Treaty
between the United States and Great Britain.191 This supple-
ment to the existing extradition treaty between the United
States and Great Britain excludes political violence from the po-
litical offense exception and therefore attempts to limit its appli-
cation to terrorists.'92 This is a realistic approach to a tough
problem. However, given the large number of extradition trea-
ties the United States has entered, it would take a considerable
amount of time for the United States to put this exclusion into
all treaties in force.
Another way for the legislature to narrow the scope of the
exception is to give the courts a working definition of political
offense. Perhaps this can be done by supplementing the existing
federal statute9" with a list of offenses that would not be in-
cluded under the political offense exception. However, problems
might arise if the legislature merely stated that all acts of vio-
lence would be excluded from the exception because then the
courts would first have to grapple with what constitutes an act
of violence. Thus, Congress would have to carefully consider how
broad, or narrow, a definition for "violence" would be appropri-
ate. Even though this would be a rather time consuming process,
it seems to be the most efficacious solution to the problem be-
190. J. MURPHY, supra note 52, at 46.
191. United Kingdom-United States Extradition Treaty Supplement Limiting
Scope of Political Offenses to Exclude Acts of Terrorism, July 17, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1104
(1985).
192. Id.
193. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181 et seq.
1991]
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cause it would actually supply the courts with a working defini-
tion of political offense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Terrorists are a threat to world peace. They are unrespon-
sive to counterterrorist policies and perhaps the only way to de-
ter their heinous activities is through the extradition process.
However, because terrorists may fall within the political offense
exception it is necessary to revise existing extradition law so that
the definition of what constitutes a "political offender" will be
narrow enough so that it will not encompass terrorists.
After reviewing the history and case law in this area, it be-
comes apparent that there is no discernable trend regarding how
to determine whether an individual is a political offender. There
was a complete reversal from the original extradition treaties,
which were primarily adopted for the surrender of political of-
fenders, to treaties which specifically exempted them from ex-
tradition.19 4 Now, because of the hybrid type political offender,
the judiciary has the task of determining the fate of relative po-
litical offenders. The courts must decide whether the act is actu-
ally a common crime or a political offense.
The task of creating guidelines for the courts is appropri-
ately left to the legislature or executive. Perhaps if the courts
had a clear definition of whether a relative political offense is a
crime or an exception to extradition, the case law would not be
so inconsistent. Because the courts cannot provide an adequate
solution to the political offense exceptions applicability to ter-
rorists, it is important that the legislative and executive
branches act soon so that extradition law will conform to our
public policy regarding terrorist activities. If so, terrorists will
know that they will not be able to seek safe haven in the United
States.
Nancy M. Green
194. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text.
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